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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS CONSIDERED 
DETERMINATIVE 
United States Constitution Amendment V 
United States Constitution Article I, §8, cl. 3 
United States Constitution Amendment IV 
Utah Constitution Article I, §14 
Utah Code Annotated §58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1986) 
Utah Code Annotated §59-19-101 through 107 (1988) (Addendum "A", 
Brief of Appellant) 
Utah Code Annotated §77-7-15 (1982) 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent is satisfied with Appellants' statement of 
the case, 
VI. STATEMENT OP PACTS 
Respondent is satisfied with Appellants' statement of 
the facts, 
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. The Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
protect citizens from unreasonable government intrusions into 
areas where they have a legitimate expectation of privacy. The 
existence of that legitimate expectation is a threshold issue in 
questions of claimed violations of rights. In this matter, 
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neither defendant has met the burden of establishing a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the concealed area of the van where the 
controlled substances were located. Towers was merely a 
passenger. At best, Robinson had permissive use of the van, 
which he claimed to have obtained from his employer. However, he 
specifically asserted that his employer had items of personal 
property in the concealed area which the employer did not want 
disturbed. Neither defendant has standing to assert Fourth 
Amendment violations. 
B. The initial reason advanced by the trooper for the 
stop of the vehicle was that it swerved sharply into his lane, 
and but for his use of brakes, would have collided with his 
patrol vehicle. Certainly under those circumstances, a 
reasonable hypothetical officer would have pursued stopping the 
defendants' vehicle. 
C. Having initiated the traffic stop, the two troopers 
on the scene continued to make observations leading to reasonable 
articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, apart 
from the moving traffic violation. They pursued their 
investigation with diligence and in the least intrusive fashion, 
until their suspicions were confirmed and they achieved probable 
cause to arrest. 
D. During the course of their investigation at the 
scene, they requested consent from Robinson to search the 
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vehicle, and later specifically requested consent to bring a 
narcotics canine to the scene. Robinson asked questions 
pertaining to the officers' request, following which he 
consented. The totality of the circumstances as contained in the 
record of the proceedings below demonstrates that the consent was 
voluntarily given. 
E. With regard to the challenge to the 
constitutionality of the Illegal Drug Tax Stamp Act, it would be 
contrary to the purposes of the Commerce Clause to give 
protection to those trafficking in controlled substances, and 
contrary to public policy, since it would mean fostering free 
trade in drugs. 
F. Marijuana cannot be construed to be a legitimate 
article of interstate commerce, since its manufacture and sale 
have never been subject to licensing, nor revenue taxation, nor 
any other express regulations. Its mere possession is illegal. 
G. Though Appellants argue that the Act violates Fifth 
Amendment protections against self-incrimination, there is no 
compulsion for one purchasing the tax stamps to provide 
incriminatory information, not even identification. There is no 
requirement whatsoever for any information which would provide a 
significant link in the chain of evidence tending to establish 
guilt. 
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H. The Act is not void for vagueness as Appellants 
urge. The terms of the Act provide explicit instruction as to 
when the tax is due and payable, what constitutes a "dealer" 
subject to the Act, and that the stamps are to be affixed to the 
substances. 
VIII. ARGUMENT 
A 
NEITHER DEFENDANT HAD A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY, 
THEREFORE NEITHER HAS STANDING TO ASSERT VIOLATION OF THE 
RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION OR UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
"protects people from unreasonable government intrusions into 
their legitimate expectations of privacy." U. S. v. Chadwick, 433 
U.S. 1, at page 7 (1977). Article I, Section 14 offers similar 
protection. However, the threshold issue which must be resolved 
is whether either of the defendants, Towers or Robinson, had any 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the compartment in the van 
wherein the controlled substances were located. 
In Rakaa v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), the United 
States Supreme Court determined that in order to have a 
legitimate expectation of privacy, one must assert either a 
property or possessory interest in the vehicle, and in the 
particular area of the vehicle searched: 
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But here petitioner's claim is one which 
would fail even in an analogous situation in 
a dwelling place, since they have made no 
showing that they had any legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the glove 
compartment or area under the seat of the 
car in which they were merely passengers. 
Like the trunk of an automobile, these are 
areas in which a passenger simply would not 
normally have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy, Rakas, at pp. 148-149. 
In the case at bar, Towers was merely a passenger. 
Robinson claimed to have the permission of the owner of the 
vehicle to be in possession of it; however, he did not have or 
assert any personal legitimate expectation of privacy in the area 
of the compartment where the controlled substances were located. 
To the contrary, he stated that his boss had his personal 
belongings under there which the employer did not want disturbed. 
The Rakas reasoning has been adopted by the Utah 
Supreme Court. In State v. Dealo, 748 P.2d 1985 (Utah, 1987), 
the defendant, a passenger in a vehicle (as Towers herein) took 
his turn driving. The other passenger in the vehicle claimed to 
have the permission of the owner of the vehicle (as Robinson 
herein). After a traffic stop, and based upon information 
obtained during the ensuing detention, the execution of a search 
warrant revealed several packages of cocaine in a concealed 
compartment in the vehicle. The Utah court relied upon Rakas in 
its analysis, and concluded that the defendant therein "presented 
no evidence establishing a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
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the area where the cocaine was found. Therefore, he had no 
standing to object to the search..." Dealo, p. 197. 
To allow defendants in the instant case to assert a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the compartment of the van 
would be allowing them to assert the rights of a third party. 
That has been specifically denied: 
Fourth Amendment rights [and, the State 
would urge, rights under Article I, Section 
14, of the Utah Constitution] are personal 
rights which, like some other 
constitutional rights, may not be 
vicariously asserted. Alderman v. U.S., 
194 U.S. 165, 174 (1969), cited with 
approval in Rakas, supra, at pages 133-134. 
[Bracketed material supplied] 
B 
THE INITIAL STOP OF THE VEHICLE WAS VALID BASED UPON 
THE TROOPER'S OBSERVATION OF THE TRAFFIC VIOLATION 
It is well-established that in the absence of clear 
error, an appellate court will uphold a trial judge's factual 
assessment underlying a decision to grant or deny a motion to 
suppress evidence. State v. Sierra, 754 P. 2d 972,974 (Utah 
Ct.App., 1988); State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah, 1987); 
State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah, 1987); State v. Branch, 
743 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah, 1987), cert. den. U.S. , 108 
S.Ct. 1597, 99 L.Ed.2d 911 (1988). 
As part of its Findings of Fact in connection with both 
the hearing on the Motion to Suppress and the Motion to Dismiss, 
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which Findings are a part of this record, the trial court 
specifically found that defendants' vehicle abruptly swerved into 
the trooper's lane of travel, causing a near collision and 
requiring the trooper to slam on his brakes to avoid same. 
In Appellants' brief, the argument pertaining to the 
trial court's decision concerning the Motion to Suppress is 
largely devoted to urging this court to adopt defendants' view of 
what they consider to be plausible and conceivable facts and 
conduct. However, they do not take issue with the factual 
finding of the trial court, nor do they urge that there has been 
any clear error. 
Absent any demonstrable clear error, the underlying 
factual assessment must be upheld. The argument that the conduct 
of defendants' vehicle did not justify a reasonable officer in 
stopping the vehicle is unpersuasive. A near collision was 
averted only by the quick response of Trooper Garcia. It cannot 
be doubted that a reasonable officer would have stopped the 
vehicle. 
C 
THE DETENTION OF DEFENDANTS WAS REASONABLE AND LIMITED 
TO THE TIME NECESSARY TO EFFECTUATE THE PURPOSE OF THE STOP AND 
TO DISPEL THE OFFICER'S SUSPICIONS REGARDING OTHER CRIMINAL 
ACTIVITY 
The trial court specifically found that from initiation 
of the traffic stop to arrest, the detention lasted thirty-eight 
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minutes. Here again, defendants urge the appellate court to make 
a different factual finding without any showing of clear error on 
the part of the trial court. They argue that the troopers 
"consistently tried to obtain consent to search an area of the 
van to which the defendants flatly denied access over a period of 
forty minutes" (Appellants' Brief, page 26). However, this bald 
assertion is flatly unsupported by the record. 
To the contrary, the record reveals that after the van 
was pulled over, there was substantial conversation with 
defendants concerning the ownership and registration of the van, 
including attempts by Trooper Garcia to verify permissive use 
with the California owner through dispatch. Trooper Garcia 
discussed with the driver the reason for the stop and issued a 
warning citation. During this period of time, there were 
observations made by the troopers which gave rise to articulable 
suspicions of criminal activity apart from the original traffic 
violation. These included the observation of marijuana seeds in 
the rear area of the vehicle. Additionally, part of the time was 
consumed by the fact that once the narcotics canine was summoned, 
it took some time for the canine officer to respond from the Salt 
Lake International Airport. Once the canine alerted, the 
defendants were placed under arrest and a search warrant obtained 
before the van was searched further. 
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The detention was clearly reasonable in length and 
reasonably related to the purpose of the stop and to dispel the 
officers' reasonable articulable suspicions which arose once they 
had the opportunity to make further observations of the vehicle 
and its occupants. The officers diligently pursued means of 
investigation which were least intrusive. 
D 
THE CONSENT OP ROBINSON WAS KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY GIVEN 
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), the 
United State Supreme Court distinguished consent to search from 
out-of-court admissions and confessions, and indicated that a 
warning of right to refuse consent was not necessary, "for it 
would be thoroughly impractical to impose on the normal consent 
search the detailed requirements of an effective warning." While 
a suspect's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be 
taken into account, "the prosecution is not required to 
demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a 
voluntary consent." 
In determining whether consent was voluntarily given 
the Court should consider the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the search. Some things the Court should consider 
are the individual's ability to understand the circumstances, the 
coercive or non-coercive atmosphere, whether the individual had 
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been placed under arrest, and whether the individual's will was 
overborne by the conduct of the officer• 
In the instant case, the record of proceedings in the 
trial court, together with the preliminary hearing transcript 
admitted by stipulation of the parties, reveal no difficulty on 
the part of Robinson in understanding what was being asked of 
him. Indeed, he even asked Trooper Ogden for clarification and 
was given same. There is no factual basis from which it can be 
assumed that the atmosphere was coercive. The testimony by 
Trooper Ogden demonstrated that he "shot the breeze" with 
Robinson about fishing and picking up girls in bars. Although 
the vehicle was being detained, defendants had not been placed 
under arrest. The conduct of the officers demonstrated a choice 
of resolving the situation through the least intrusive means. 
Once the canine alerted, a search warrant was obtained before the 
vehicle was more thoroughly searched. 
The totality of the circumstances as established by the 
record demonstrated that Robinson's consent was voluntarily 
given. 
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E 
GRANTING COMMERCE CLAUSE PROTECTION TO THE POSSESSION 
AND/OR SALE OF MARIJUANA IS COUNTER TO THE PURPOSES OF 
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY 
In urging the Court to dismiss Count II of the 
Information in the above-captioned matter, which involves the 
offense of Unlawful Possession of Marijuana Without Tax Stamps 
Affixed, Defendants argue that the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act is 
violative of the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution, Article I, Section 8. However, Defendants' attempt 
to include marijuana as a legitimate article of commerce is 
misdirected, as is evident from the fact that giving Commerce 
Clause protection to marijuana and other controlled substances 
runs counter to the stated purposes of Article I, Section 8. 
The primary and underlying purposes of the Commerce 
Clause are: 
(1) To foster free trade among the states 
[Cf. H.P. Hood and Sons, Inc. v. Dumond, 
336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949)]; 
(2) To prevent interstate trade wars 
[Cf. Hood, supra, at 539]; and, 
(3) To prevent states from favoring local 
interests [Cf. McGoldrick v. Berwlnd-White 
Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 45-46 (1940)]. 
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Free trade among the states means "that every farmer 
and craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty 
that he will have free access to every market in the Nation ..." 
Hood, supra, at page 539. Bringing marijuana within Commerce 
Clause protection means, "...every marijuana grower or dealer or 
trafficker shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that 
he will have free access to every market in the Nation...". Such 
a result is clearly outside of the intent of our Founding Fathers 
and contrary to public policy. 
To prevent interstate trade wars means "...every 
consumer may look to free competition from every producing area 
in the Nation, to protect him from exploitation by any. Such was 
the vision of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this 
Court which has given it reality." Hood, supra, at page 539. 
Bringing marijuana within Commerce Clause protection means 
"...every marijuana user may look to free competition as between 
all growers/dealers/traffickers in the Nation, to protect him 
from exploitation by any...". Certainly such a result was not 
the vision of the Founders or the doctrine of any court which has 
been called upon to consider the use and possession of marijuana 
or other controlled substances. 
A final purpose of Article I, Section 8 is to prevent 
states from favoring local interests. This means taxes are 
condemned if used to place interstate commerce at a competitive 
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disadvantage. Since out-of-state residents have no access to the 
state political process, they are thought to be particularly 
vulnerable and in need of Commerce Clause protection. 
Bringing marijuana within Commerce Clause protection 
means placing all marijuana growers or dealers or traffickers on 
equal footing and ensuring that out-of-state growers or dealers 
or traffickers will not be put at an economic disadvantage when 
competing against instate growers, dealers and traffickers. This 
tortured pseudological reasoning is clearly outside the purposes 
of Article x, section 8. 
When viewed against the historical backdrop of Commerce 
Clause purposes, as defined by the above-stated authorities, it 
is clear that Defendants' attempt to extend these protections to 
those who grow, deal or traffick in marijuana or other 
controlled substances should fail. Such a result was not within 
the contemplation of the Founding Fathers or any court since 
called upon to interpret the Commerce Clause, and it is against 
public policy. 
F 
MARIJUANA IS NOT A LEGITIMATE ARTICLE OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 
In Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343 (1900), the United 
States Supreme Court held that cigarettes were legitimate 
articles of commerce. The Court stated its reasons as follows: 
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Congress, too, has recognized tobacco in 
its various forms as a legitimate article 
of commerce by requiring licenses to be 
taken for its manufacture and sale, 
imposing a revenue tax upon each package of 
cigarettes put upon the market, and by-
making express regulations for their 
manufacture and sale, their exportation and 
importation...Austin at p. 
The Court went on to state that we cannot hold that any 
article which Congress recognizes in so many ways is not a 
legitimate article of commerce." (Austin, supra, at page 345, 
empha sis added). 
The question then arises whether Congress has ever 
recognized marijuana or other controlled substances as legitimate 
article of commerce by: 
(1) Requiring licenses to be taken for manufacture and 
sale to the general public; 
(2) Imposing revenue taxes upon each quantity put upon 
the market; or 
(3) Making express regulations for manufacture and sale 
to the general public, or for exportation and importation. 
The answer is quite clear. Congress has done nothing 
whatsoever to give even the appearance or suggestion of 
legitimacy to marijuana or any other controlled substance. Quite 
the contrary, Congress continuously enhances the criminal 
penalties for possession and possession with intent to 
distribute. 
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Defendants conveniently overlook the blatant fact that 
the activity of possessing marijuana or other controlled 
substances in and of itself illegal, as is transporting such 
substances. On page 32 of Appellants; Brief They describe their 
activity simply as "Kim Robinson and Francis Towers were merely 
transporting a substance through Utah.*.". (Brief of Appellants, 
page 32, emphasis added) 
In summary, the conduct of possessing and transporting 
marijuana or other controlled substances does not come within the 
protection of the Commerce Clause because: 
(1) It is outside the purpose for which the Article I, 
Section 8 was created and intended; and 
(2) Marijuana is not a legitimate article of interstate 
commerce. 
G 
THE ILLEGAL DRUG TAX STAMP ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FIFTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 
Defendants argue that their Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination is violated by the Illegal Drug Tax 
Stamp Act because: 
(1) The purchase of the stamp itself is an admission of 
illegal activity; and/or 
(2) Displaying the stamps on the marijuana will 
indicate knowledge that you are possessing marijuana and 
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therefore is a "link in a chain of evidence tending to establish 
guilt." 
The United States Supreme Court has established a test 
to determine whether or not a tax statute violates the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination, and thus makes 
penalties for noncompliance unenforceable. The test consists of 
three elements: 
(1) Whether the tax is in an area permeated with penal 
laws and therefore directed towards a select group inherently 
suspected of criminal activities; 
(2) Whether, in order to comply with the tax one is 
compelled to provide information which he might reasonably 
suppose to be available to prosecuting authorities; and, 
(3) Whether the compelled information is such as would 
surely prove a significant link in the chain of evidence tending 
to establish guilt. If any one of the three elements is missing 
there is no Fifth Amendment violation. Cf. Leary v. U.S., 395 
U.S. 6 (1969); Marchetti v. U.S., 390 U.S. 39 (1968). 
In this case the second and third elements are wholly 
lacking. Under the Illegal Drug Tax Stamp Act, the taxpayer is 
not compelled to give any information whatsoever, other than the 
quantity of stamps desired to be purchased. There is no 
registration form or tax return that must be submitted. Complete 
anonymity is afforded purchasers. The only requirements are that 
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the tax amount be paid, and thereafter that the tax stamps be 
affixed to the controlled substance. Cf. Section 59-19-105, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended. Therefore, the taxpayer cannot 
reasonably suppose that compelled information will be available 
to prosecuting authorities or that compelled information will 
surely prove a significant link in the chain of evidence tending 
to establish guilt. 
Defendants further argue that the act of purchasing 
stamps at the Tax Commission or otherwise obtaining them is an 
admission of illegal activity, and therefore, an act of self-
incrimination. However, the taxpayer is not required to appear 
at the Tax Commission nor is anyone else required to appear. The 
only requirement is that the tax be paid. The stamps can be 
mailed to any address including a mail drop or private mailbox 
company. The stamps can be picked up by messenger service, cab 
company or any individual. A taxpayer can combine a series of as 
many of these steps as he desires, and need supply no 
incriminatory information, not even as to his physical 
appearance. Therefore, he is not compelled to make any type of 
admission that could even remotely be characterized as self-
incriminatory. 
In addition, the third element is lacking because there 
is no compelled information which would prove a "significant 
link" in the chain of evidence tending to establish guilt. The 
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stamp itself says nothing of who did the purchasing or affixing. 
As already noted, information as to who actually purchased the 
stamp or affixed it is outside the statutory requirements. 
The United States Supreme Court has plainly stated that 
fanciful or trifling hazards of self-incrimination such as those 
conjured up by Defendants do not rise to constitutional 
significance: 
The central standard for the privilege's 
application has been whether the claimant 
is confronted by substantial and real, and 
not merely trifling or Imaginary, hazards 
of incrimination. Marchettl v. United 
States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968), emphasis 
added, citations omitted. 
The Illegal Drug Tax Stamp Act does not impinge Defendants' Fifth 
Amendment rights. 
H 
SECTION 59-19-101 et seq., UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED 
COMPORTS WITH SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
Defendants' final argument is that the statute is too 
vague for an individual to understand what conduct is prohibited 
and is so vague that law enforcement will be arbitrary and 
discriminatory. Defendants advance the following syllogism to 
support their view: 
(1) Kim Robinson and Francis Towers had no directions 
as to where to place the stamps; 
(2) The arresting officers could not know where to look 
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for the stamps; and 
(3) Therefore, the opportunity for abuse and illegal 
arrests is flagrant, and the law invalid. 
As stated in Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 461 U.S. 352, at 
page 357 (1983), a statute defining criminal conduct must 
"...enable individuals to conform their conduct to the 
requirements of the law..." and not be so vague that "...persons 
of common intelligence must guess at its meaning and differ as to 
its application." 
Defendants' argument is without merit because the 
statute is not vague. The tax is "due and payable immediately 
upon acquisition" or "possession" of "marijuana" or a "controlled 
substance" by a "dealer." Cf. Section 59-19-105(2), Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended. The terms "marijuana," "controlled 
substance" and "dealer" are specifically defined. To evidence 
payment of the tax the dealer is required to immediately affix 
the tax stamp to the substance. No dealer may possess any 
marijuana or controlled substance on which tax is imposed unless 
the tax has been paid as evidenced by a stamp. If a dealer does 
possess such drugs without payment of the tax and affixment of 
the stamp, there is a 100% penalty in addition to the tax. 
Defendants' questions as to where the stamps are to be 
placed, or how the officers are going to know where to look for 
the stamps are plainly answered by the statute: you place the 
-20-
stamps on the marijuana or controlled substance. The officers 
look on the marijuana or controlled substance: 
When a dealer purchases, acquires, 
transports, or imports into the state 
marijuana or controlled substances, he 
shall permanently affix the official 
indicia on the marijuana or controlled 
substances evidencing the payment of the 
tax required under this chapter. No stamp 
or other official indicia may be used more 
than once. §59-19-105(1), Utah Code 
Annotated. 
X. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the argument and authorities presented, and 
upon the record, Respondent seeks affirmance of the decision of 
the trial court with regard to the Motion to Suppress and the 
Motion to Dismiss, and the affirmance of the convictions of both 
defendants. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Utah Attorney General 
WENDY HUENAGEL 
WILLIAM/J. ALBRIGHT /~ 
Special Asst. Attys^ : General 
By: 
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